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Abstract
This paper explores the links between unemployment, retirement and their associated
public insurance programs. It is a contribution to a growing body of literature focused on
a better understanding of the labor behavior of advanced-age workers, which has gained
importance as the pension crisis looms. It also contributes to the literature of optimal unem-
ployment insurance by exploring the interaction of unemployment bene¯ts and retirement
pensions. The analysis combines the development of a new theoretical model and a detailed
exploration of the empirical regularities using the Spanish Muestra Continua de Vidas Lab-
orales (MCVL) dataset. The model is an extension of the standard search model, designed
to reproduce the non-stationary environment faced by workers of advanced ages (in the age
range 50/65).
Via calibrated simulations we show that the basic empirical re-employment and retirement
patterns can be considered as rational responses to both the labor market conditions and the
institutional incentives. Generous Unemployment Bene¯ts (for durations of up to two years)
together with very signi¯cant early retirement penalties, make optimal to stay unemployed
without searching for large groups of unemployed workers. This moral hazard problem can
be substantially alleviated through institutional reform. We explore several potential reforms
and ¯nd that changing the details of early retirement pensions seems more promising than
changing the Unemployment Bene¯t system.
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In the last three decades, a large majority of OECD countries has seen a widespread tendency
towards lower employment rates among its older workforce.1 At the same time, declining birth
rates and rising life expectancies have started to have an impact on the size and age structure of
the population in OECD countries. These changes are expected to produce dramatic e®ects in
the near future. For example, the OECD predicts that the working-age population (15{64 years)
will be 18% smaller than the current one by 2050, and the numbers of those aged over 65 years will
increase by 60%. These changes will have profound implications for the European economy and
its capacity to ¯nance its welfare and health care systems. This gloomy prospect has triggered an
intense academic and political debate, whose ¯rst practical implications are starting to become
apparent. The recent delays in the normal retirement age in the US or Germany or the higher
participation rates targeted in the Lisbon-2000 objective are good examples.2
From an academic point of view, these changes have resulted in renewed e®orts to understand
the labor supply behavior of older workers. Up to now, the main target of this research has
been exploring the labor decisions of the employed workers. This focus is understandable, as
this group represent a large majority of the labor force.3 However, in countries with substantial
unemployment rates, like Spain, the unemployed constitute a potentially signi¯cant alternative
source of extra labor supply. However, attracting unemployed workers back to employment
seems, at ¯rst inspection, really challenging. Firstly, their reemployment rates are very low,
with independence of the workers characteristics (education, gender, sector, ...)4. Furthermore,
according to their answers to speci¯c questions in labor surveys, their job-search e®ort is very
low. For example, less than 17% of the unemployed aged 50-54 reply that they are actively
looking for a new job in the full sample of the European Community Household Panel (1994-
2001). This number falls to less than 3% for those aged more than 60. In Spain, the values are
a slightly bigger: 17.7% and 6.7% respectively according to the Spanish Labor Force Survey in
2005-2006).
The traditional interpretation of these facts emphasizes the low demand existing for work-
ers in such an advanced age interval, and the high personal costs imposed by searching and
re-training at those ages. Alternatively (and without denning the importance of the more tradi-
tional factors) in this paper we explore whether low participation rates may also re°ect a rational
answer to \perverse" incentives provided by public institutions. On the one hand, this group
frequently enjoy special Unemployment Bene¯ts schemes, that may make them more reluctant
to take low job o®ers. On the other hand, early retirement is an attractive possibility for large
groups of workers of this age. This makes the relevant institutional environment substantially
1There is, however, some evidence that in the last few years this tendency has slowed down and in some
countries reversed itself. See eg Benitez-Silva et al. (2006) for recent evidence for the US.
2There has been widespread delays in both the Early and Normal retirement ages in OECD countries. See
Casey et al. (2003) for a detailed enumeration. For the EU members, the policy action has revolved around the
Lisbon-2000 objectives. They set a explicit target (50%) for the employment rate of workers of more than 50
years of age in 2010.
3An exception is Stiglitz and Yun (2005), a pioneer work advocating the integration of the retirement and
unemployment schemes.








more complex than the one for younger workers. In particular, some unemployed may ¯nd it
advantageous to use the unemployment bene¯t to stay in the labor force without searching,
with the only purpose of reducing the penalties associated with early retirement. Note that the
quantitative importance of these penalties can be important (In Spain, the replacement rate of
the ¯nal pension over the accrual pension rights is reduced by 7.5% for each year retirement
is brought forward). Exploring the rationality of these alternatives is our main target in this
paper.
Viewed in this light, the paper is an extension of the optimal unemployment bene¯t litera-
ture, in a world of imperfect information and hidden actions (as exempli¯ed by eg. Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997), Kocherlakota (2004) or Shimer and Werning (2003)): our ¯nal target is to
improve the institutional design to make it more robust to the moral hazard problem associated
with the provision of public insurance. This task is more complicated for workers approaching
retirement due to the interactions between Unemployment Bene¯ts and pension regulations.
And, needless to say, the opportunistic use of the unemployment bene¯t may result in a sig-
ni¯cant increased of the costs implied by these workers to the Social Security System (ie, the
combined pension/unemployement insurance systems).
The theoretical framework implemented in the paper extends the traditional search model
to include the alternatives of retirement and non-participation (ie. staying in the labor force
without searching).5 The model contributes to the existing retirement literature (exempli¯ed by
eg. Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2005) or Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005)) by formally
exploring the unemployment path into retirement. The paper also contributes to the literature
on search models by considering non-participation decisions in a non-stationary environment
including the risk of dismissal. The possibility of non-participation in an otherwise standard
search model was ¯rst analyzed in Van den Berg (1990). More recently, Frijters and Van der
Klaauw (2006) estimates an structural, non-stationary search model with non-participation,
where the state of inactivity (considered as an absorbing one) is unrelated to the economic con-
ditions. Our analysis improves upon the former by considering the fundamental non-stationarity
induced by age considerations, and upon the latter by providing a full economic description of
the non-participation state (ie, retirement).
We explore the basic theoretical predictions of this model but, due to the impossibility of
obtaining closed-form expressions for the optimal decisions in the most general cases, we also
rely on calibrated simulations. To this end, we select the values of the main parameters of the
model so as to approximately replicate the empirical retirement and reemployment hazards, and
the average accepted wages by the unemployed that reenter the labor force6. After calibrating
the model, we are able to quantify the incidence of voluntary non-participation. We also explore
5Including frictions in the re-employment process is probably more important at the ages considered in this
paper that for younger workers. This is due to a number of elements: to the (potencial) labor market bias against
older workers; to the uncertainty about the cost and usefulness of the (re-training and) search process; and to the
existence of generous public income-maintenance programs, that make it feasible to stay out of the labor force
for long periods (even forever, if the workers opts for the retirement option).
6We have also conducted an extensive sensitivity analysis on the basic parameters of the model. The results









some institutional changes designed to improve on the labor-incentives generated by the current
system.
A basic ¯nding of our analysis is that the empirical search behavior at advanced ages can
be rationalized as the response of rational individuals to both the labor market conditions and
the institutional incentives. We show that a model that combines those two elements goes a
long way in reproducing the re-employment and retirement patterns observed in the Spanish
data. Both elements matter: we show via simulation that even in presence of a much larger
arrival rate of job o®ers, the predicted re-employment rate in the current institutional setting
would be rather small. The reason lies in the combination of generous Unemployment Bene¯ts
(for durations of up to two years), and substantial penalties for early retirement. Together,
they make staying unemployed without searching an optimal strategy for a very large part
(around 50%) of the unemployed in the age range 55/65. Although the Spanish authorities
have largely turned a blind eye on this \alternative" exit route into retirement, it seems a
clear abuse of the original mandate of the unemployment insurance scheme (namely, support
workers in their search process). Changing this pattern would demand a substantial reform of
the present institutions. Our simulations show that reducing the generosity of Unemployment
Bene¯ts would not be particularly successful, as it pushes workers mainly into retirement (in
the end, to search for new jobs, workers must be provided with a decent income in the process).
A more promising (although rather ruthless) avenue focuses on redesigning the early retirement
penalties of the unemployed. If the penalty were ¯xed according to the age when the individual
e®ectively withdraws from the labor force (rather than when he/she claims the pension for the
¯rst time), the incentives to stay idle would be much smaller. Our simulation indicate that such
a measure would be very e®ective in reducing non-participation and increasing labor supply,
specially after the early retirement age.
The structure of the paper is the following. Firstly (section 2) we present the basic empirical
regularities concerning re-employment and retirement behavior in our sample of Spanish workers
in the age range 55/65. These regularities provide the stylized facts that guide the speci¯cation
of our theoretical model, which is discussed at length in section 3. In section 4 we present
the main predictions of the model. We review both the theoretical results (section 4.1), the
simulation design (section 4.2), its calibration (section 4.3) and its main results, including our
policy simulation experiments (section 4.4). Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Stylized Facts
To analyze the evidence on the labor supply patterns of Spanish workers of advanced age we have
used the latest release (January 2007) of the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL05
hereafter, an administrative dataset based on a random draw from the Spanish Social Security
archives. The database (along with some reduced-form econometric analysis) is described in
detail in the companion paper Garc¶ ³a P¶ erez and S¶ anchez-Mart¶ ³n (2007). Here we only refer to
the most fundamental ¯ndings.7
7The regularities reported correspond to a relatively narrow sub-sample of the MCVL05, selected to guarantee








We have explored the transitions of unemployed workers out of the labor force (into retire-
ment) or back into work (and their associated accepted wages) paying special attention to the
role of age, duration in unemployment, pension rights (\Bases reguladoras", de¯ned precisely in
section 3.1) and wages in the immediately preceding job. This has resulted in a relatively small
set of empirical patterns, that we summarize (and enumerate for later reference) in the next two
(sub)sections.
2.1 Empirical evidence on search behavior
The most signi¯cant ¯ndings regarding the job-acceptance performance of unemployed workers
can be summarized as follows:
S1 The re-employment hazard decreases with age in the range 55/60 and remains constant
thereafter.
S2 In the age range 55/60, the re-employment hazard decreases with duration (the length of
the unemployment spell in years, represented by h). After 60, the pattern is more erratic.
S3 The re-employment hazard decreases with the size of the pension rights (with one excep-
tion: before the early retirement age, 60, the unemployed with average pension rights have
higher re-entry hazards that those with low pension rights).
S4 Accepted re-employment wages are roughly constant with age.
Regularity S1 is illustrated in Figure 2: the quarterly re-employment hazard (ie. the condi-
tional probability of making a transition from unemployment to employment) goes down from
a value around 7% for workers of 55 years of age, to only 2% at 60. This small number con¯rms
the general impression that ¯nding jobs is a very di±cult task at ages close to the \standard"
retirement ages for the pension system. Regularity S2 (displayed in the top left panel of Fig-
ure 4) is a negative duration dependence of the type usually described in mainstream search
literature. In our data, the reemployment hazard before 60 is clearly lower for the long-term
unemployed (those that receive bene¯ts for more than 2 years, ie h=3). The pattern is not
as clear cut at lower durations (h=1 or h=2). After the early retirement age, the ranking of
hazards changes and the long-term unemployed seem to reenter in larger proportion. This may
be pointing to a composition e®ect: workers with lower re-employment chances probably retire
in larger numbers at the early retirement age. The composition of this group after 60 may, then,
be di®erent from that before 60. We must bear in mind, in any case, that the sample size after
60 is not very big. S3 is illustrated in the top-right panel of Figure 4. For that graph we split
the sample in three groups according with the percentiles 1/3 and 2/3 of the sample distribution
of pension rights. At early ages, the reemployment hazard of workers with high pension rights
counterparts to the stylized individuals in our theoretical model rather than in generality. Consequently, we
consider low skilled males of 55 years of age or older, a±liated with the General Regime of the Spanish Social
Security system, who are entitled to receive Unemployment Bene¯ts and an old-age pension at retirement. We
exclude individuals who sign special agreements with the Social Security, and individuals with missing information
















Figure 1: Transition from Unemployment to Employment: Quarterly re-employment













Figure 2: Accepted wages: Annual average accepted wage (in thousand of Euros of 2002) by
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 U→ R by Pension rights
Figure 4: quarterly reemployment hazard (top row) and annual retirement hazard
(bottom row), by age; duration (h=1 is plotted with a blue, continuous line, h=2 with a
green, dashed line, and h=3 with a red, dotted line); and pension rights (those below the
percentile 33% are plotted with a blue, continuous line, those between 33% and 67% with a








is very low, while that of workers with low pension rights is clearly higher, specially after 58.
Finally, S4 is presented in Figure 2. Average annual accepted wages by unemployed workers
re-entering the labor force show little variation. Most of them stay within the range from 11.5
to 12.5 thousand Euros (of 2004). It is also possible to detect some selection e®ects after 60, as
the general pattern seem to be slightly decreasing before the Normal Retirement Age (NRA).
2.2 Empirical evidence on retirement behavior
Regarding the transition from unemployment to permanent retirement, we highlight the follow-
ing empirical regularities:
R1 The retirement hazard varies strongly with age. It is higher at the early retirement age
(60) and, more clearly, at the normal retirement age of 65. In the intermediate ages, the
hazard remains roughly constant at a lower level8.
R2 The retirement hazard is strongly increasing with duration in unemployment (h).
R3 The retirement hazard is larger the higher the size of accrued pension rights, with the
exception of the early retirement age (at 60, the hazard is slightly higher for the unemployed
with low pension rights).
The basic pattern of the retirement hazard by age, R1, is reported in Figure 3. The spikes
at 60 and 65 are similar to those reported in the previous literature based on the behavior of
employees (See, for example Jim¶ enez Mart¶ ³n and S¶ anchez Mart¶ ³n (2005) or Rust and Phelan
(1997)). The main di®erence is the substantially larger hazard out of the labor force at the
intermediate ages. The bottom panels of Figure 4 clearly illustrate regularities R2 and R3. The
evidence regarding duration is a new and apparently very strong new stylized fact. R3 is better
known from the previous literature. It is well known that minimum pensions tend to foster the
early retirement of workers with low pension rights. This seems to be also the case in our sample
of unemployed workers. After that age the higher disincentive e®ect to stay active created by
higher pension rights prevail.
3 The model
We model the search, participation and retirement behavior of unemployed workers in the age
range a 2 f55;65g at one particular point in time. Time is assumed to be discrete, with one
period in the model standing for one year of calendar time. All agents in the model face the same
survival uncertainty, represented by the (age-conditional) survival function Sa. Labor market
uncertainty depends on the state of the individual.
8When we refer to a peak in the hazard at 60 we are stressing the drop in the conditional retirement probability
observed after that age. Note that, as we identify retirement with the collection of pension bene¯ts, the absence
of retirement before the Early Retirement Age is entirely a matter of construction. In the graphs, however, we
see a non-negative hazard at earlier ages, due to measurement error -probably related to an erroneous recording








Figure 5: Timing of decisions and revelation of information in the model.
At the beginning of any period individuals of all ages are classi¯ed in one of three mutually
exclusive labor states: employed, unemployed or retired. Retirement is a purely passive state,
associated with the perception of the pension bene¯t, B, and with a permanent withdrawal
from the labor force. Employed workers have a time invariant real wage, w, and face a constant
probability ± of being ¯red at the end of the current period. After the Early Retirement Age,
ERA, they have the option of voluntarily leaving the labor force and start collecting the pension
bene¯t.9 In this paper we focus our attention on the behavior of the unemployed. Figure 5
summarizes in a visual way the di®erent options opened at di®erent times to each unemployed
worker. Immediately after the dismissal, three courses of action are possible: to retire immedi-
ately (R in the graph); to actively search for a new job (S) or to stay inactive (N). Those that opt
for an active search strategy incur the associated search costs immediately, and receive one job
o®er at the beginning of the next period with probability ¸h (conditional on the duration of the
unemployment spell, h). The o®er is fully characterized by the wage, which is a random draw
from the invariant distribution F(w). If the o®er is rejected, the unemployed can either stay
unemployed for another period or retire immediately (again, after ERA). Unemployed workers
who opt for non-participation do not incur in any search cost in the present, but do not re-
ceive a job o®er in the next period either. In theory, it should not be possible to receive the
normal unemployment bene¯t without searching for a job at the same time, but we assume
the public administration do not enforce this prohibition. This is in line with the empirical
evidence.10 Therefore, in both states (search and non participation), the individual receives the
same unemployment bene¯t, b. We assume nobody can stay active after 70 years of age.
3.1 Institutions and market arrangements
Unemployment bene¯ts
The general unemployment bene¯t scheme pays a proportion bh of the wages enjoyed in the
immediately preceding job, although the wage/bene¯t proportionality is broken by a °oor bmin
and a ceiling bmax on the ¯nal bene¯ts. The replacement rates bh decrease with the duration, in
9Although we do consider the optimal retirement decisions of employees in the following analysis, we do not
report the ¯ndings here due to our focal interest on the behavior of the unemployed.
10For example, by the end of 2006, only 13 of those aged more than 45 and receiving Unemployment Bene¯ts








years, of the current unemployment spell, h. In the population at large, individuals can receive
the (contributive) Unemployment Bene¯ts for a maximum of two years. People older than 52,
in contrast, are entitled to a speci¯c program granting the subsidy bs
min (75% of the minimum





Maxfbmin; Minfb1¼;bmaxg g if h = 1
Maxfbmin; Minfb2¼;bmaxg g if h = 2
bs
min if h ¸ 3
(1)
The public employment agency (INEM) not only provides immediate income to the unem-
ployed, it also protects their future pension income by paying their pay-roll taxes to the Social
Security system. These social contributions are a ¯xed proportion of the \pensionable wage"
of the individual. In the current system, INEM contributes the full previous wages of those
unemployed with a duration of less than two years, and the minimum contribution in case of
a longer duration. More generally, we represent the \pensionable wage" (ie the labor income
considered in the pension formula described below) with a duration-dependent replacement rate
of the previous wage, ·h ¼ . Finally, we do not consider in this paper workers covered by special
agreements with the pension administration.
The pension system
The public pension can be claimed at any age after the Early Retirement age, ERA (Nm
in the following equations), conditional on a complete withdrawal from labor market activities.
The pension bene¯t of each worker is computed in two steps. First, an individual-speci¯c com-
ponent related to the worker's previous earnings is calculated. Next, this bene¯t is subsequently
compared with the legal minimum and maximum pensions prevailing at each year to determine
the ¯nal e®ective payment.
The individual component ( ~ B) depends on age and on the retiree's accrued pension rights,
^ w:
~ B( ^ w;a) = ¹(a) ^ wa (2)
The age-dependant replacement rate ¹(a) re°ects an annual ¹1 % penalty for early retirement





¹0 if a < Nm
¹0 + ¹1(a ¡ ¿m) < 1 if a 2 fNm;:::;N ¡ 1g
1 if ¿ ¸ N
(3)
Accrued pension rights (called \Base Reguladora") are, in the real world, a moving average of














Unfortunately, implementing this formula in the model implies large computational costs. In-
stead, we simplify the dynamics of ^ w by assuming that, for an individual with current labor
income w, next period pension rights will be:11
^ w0
a+1 = ^ w +
w ¡ ^ w
D
(4)
Finally, the scheme is made progressive by the inclusion of °oors and ceilings in the ¯nal
payment. This breaks the strict proportionality between the e®ective bene¯t B( ^ w;a) and the
(average) level of previous wages that would otherwise prevail:




Bmin if ~ B(w; ^ w;a) < Bmin
~ B( ^ w;a) if Bmin · ~ B(w; ^ w;a) · Bmax
Bmax if Bmax < ~ B(w; ^ w;a)
(5)
The e®ective bene¯t is ¯rst computed when the individual retires and is kept constant in real
terms throughout the rest of his/her life12.
3.2 Optimal individual behavior
In every period (as described at the beginning of the section and represented in Figure 5, the
unemployed who searched in the previous period take the decision of whether to accept or reject
any wage o®er they receive and (in case of rejection) whether to stay unemployed or retire from
the labor force. The unemployed who did not search in the past may reconsider his decisions
and search during the current period, stay unemployed without searching or retire. Finally,
employees must decide on whether to keep working for the same wage or to retire. Note that
we do not allow voluntary transitions from employment into unemployment. In all cases we
assume individuals are expected utility maximizers, ie. they decide by comparing the expected
discounted utility obtained from the associated °ows of income and leisure in the di®erent
alternatives:
e¤







a stands for the optimal sequence of present and future labor states from age a till the
maximum possible age for labor participation, N (70 in the base calibration). T is the maximum
longevity, ¯ is a constant discount factor representing a pure preference for earlier consumption,
and individual preferences at every age are represented by an (age-invariant) additively separable
CES indirect utility function:
11The approximation is exact under our assumption of constant wages for the employees.
12We abstract from a number of relatively minor details of the pension and ¯scal systems. In particular, the
individual in the model does not take into account income taxes and the worker part of pay-roll taxes (much
smaller than the employer part in Spain). We also do not include pension reductions due to an insu±cient















0 e = E
¡c e = S
l e = (R;N)
where ´ measures the curvature of the objective function (which, in turn, determines both
the degree of risk aversion and the willingness to substitute income intertemporally) and º(e)
represents the variation in the value attached to the di®erent uses of time, according with the
labor state. In our base speci¯cation, we normalize this value to cero for employees, assume a
negative value (¡c) for the unemployed that search and a positive one (l) for non participants
and retirees. Finally c, represents the costs associated with the search process (including the
cost of re-training and the possible `stigma' cost of staying unemployed), while l re°ects the
value of leisure enjoyed when time is not devoted to labor-market activities.
Recursive Representation of the individual problem
As usual, we work with a recursive representation of this discrete-time, optimal control problem.
This means that we characterize its solution via the value functions associated with each labor
state. These value functions are solved by backward induction starting at N. As everybody is
assumed to retire at that age, the only relevant value function is that of the workers to leave
the labor force at that age:
RN( ^ w) =
T X
i=N
SN(i)¯i¡Nu(B( ^ w;N); R) =
µ





where SN(i) stands for the survival probability to age i ¸ N conditional on survival to age N
and A
j
i is the expected discounted value of a constant income °ow of one unit starting at age
i and ending at age j. To simplify the notation, from here onwards we denote the (one period
ahead) e®ective discounting at age a, ¯ Sa(a + 1), by ¯a. R is simply the expected discounted
value of the utility derived from the enjoyment of pension B( ^ w;N) and the full allocation of
time to non-market activities.
At earlier ages, a < N, all relevant information is captured by the value functions cor-
responding to the four possible labor states: W;S;N;R representing, respectively, employees,
unemployed who search, non-participant unemployed and retirees. We review them in turn.
3.2.1 Employed workers
Currently employed workers have the option to retire immediately or to retain their current
status for one more period. In the latter case (denoted by a small e as a superscript of W),
workers face, on top of survival uncertainty, the risk of being ¯red and start next period as
unemployed. This is easily re°ected in the corresponding value function:
We
a(w; ^ w) = u(w;E) + ¯a
£
(1 ¡ ±)Wa+1(w; ^ w0) + ± Ua+1(w; ^ w0;1)
¤
(7)
For any variable, a prime denote the value of the same variable in the next period. Note that








and U are de¯ned below. For the employees who ¯nd it optimal to retire at age a 2 [Nm;N],
things do not change in any fundamental way with respect to what we described above for the
case a = N. In particular, the value function takes a completely analogous form to that in
(6). Finally, the total value of being employed, including the option of retirement, is simply
characterized by:
Wa(w; ^ w) = MaxfWe
a(w; ^ w);Ra( ^ w)g
3.2.2 Unemployed workers
For the unemployed we consider three di®erent value functions. On the one hand, we represent
with Sa(¼; ^ w;h) the value associated with engaging in an active search process while unemployed,
and with Na(¼; ^ w;h) the value of avoiding search cost, at the price of giving up the chance of
receiving job o®ers in the next period. In both cases, a vector of four state variables (age
a, previous wage ¼, pension rights ^ w and duration in unemployment h) is needed to fully
characterize the economic situation of those unemployed. On the other hand, the unemployed
at the beginning of the period have the option of leaving the labor force and retire, with value
Ra( ^ w). Consequently, the total value attached to be unemployed at the beginning of the period,
Ua(¼; ^ w;h), is:
Ua(¼; ^ w;h) = MaxfSa(¼; ^ w;h);Na(¼; ^ w;h);Ra( ^ w)g
We review each component next.
The value of getting involved in an active search process , Sa(¼; ^ w;h), is made up of two
elements, a (presumably modest) current value u(b(¼;h);S) of searching, and a expected future
value of searching (EV S):
EV S = ¯a
(
¸h+1 Ew[MaxfUa+1(¼; ^ w0;h + 1);Wa+1(w; ^ w0)g]
+(1 ¡ ¸h+1)Ua+1(¼; ^ w0;h + 1)
)
(8)
where ¸h+1 represents the conditional o®er arrival rate in the next period and pension rights
are updated as in (4), ie: ^ w0 = ^ w + ·h ¼¡ ^ w
D : In words, the expected future value re°ects two
elements:
² If an o®er of size w arrives, the individual must decide whether to accept or reject it.
The optimal decision is obtained by comparing Wa+1(w; ^ w0) to Ua+1(¼; ^ w0;h + 1). Of
course, at t, the size of the wage o®er is uncertain. Consequently, the individual operates
by taking conditional expectations, which accounts for the Ew[:] in (8).
As usual in the literature, the job-acceptance decision is summarized (for each possible
value of the state variables) by the corresponding Reservation Wage, wa(¼; ^ w;h): the wage
o®er that makes the unemployed indi®erent between taking the job or staying unemployed.
Formally:








² If no o®er arrives or if the o®er received is unacceptable, the associated value is that of
staying unemployed one more period, ie. Ua+1(¼; ^ w0;h + 1). Note the di®erent updating
of the pension rights with respect to the previous case (in presence of an acceptable o®er).
The probability of this case is 1 ¡ ¸h+1 (1 ¡ F(w0)), where w0 stands for the next period
reservation wage, wa+1(¼; ^ w0;h + 1). We slightly simplify this expression by representing
1 ¡ F(x) by F(x). In what follows, then, the probability of this case reduces to 1 ¡
¸h+1 F(w0).
Overall, the expected future value of searching is composed of two elements: a Stop Value
of ¯nishing the current unemployment spell by accepting an o®er immediately and an Option
Value derived from staying unemployed and so keeping the chances of getting acceptable job
o®ers in the future.
The value of Non-Participant unemployment, Na(¼; ^ w;h), is much simpler to formulate
than the option with active search, as it does not involve any uncertainty (apart from survival
risk):
Na(¼; ^ w;h) = u(b(¼;h);l) + ¯a+1 Ua+1(¼; ^ w0;h + 1)
with pension rights updated as in the immediately preceding case.
Finally, the retirement option is similar to what has been previously discussed and does not
demand any special additional comment.
4 Results
4.1 Theoretical Findings
Due to the lack of analytical solutions, it is di±cult to characterize the properties of the optimal
individual behavior in a completely general way. Fortunately, it is relatively easy to show
the main trade-o®s faced by the individuals at di®erent ages. This is the task we tackle in
this section. To streamline the discussion, the economic environment faced by the unemployed
here is simpler than the general one presented in Section 3. We assume a linear and additive
separable period utility u = w + l and forced retirement at 65; we abstract from °oor/ceilings
in the public regulations (like minimum pensions or maximum Unemployment Bene¯ts) and
assume the employees face no risk of being ¯red. In this setting the value functions are linear,
allowing for a very illustrative discussion of the main forces involved. Once equipped with the
intuitions obtained in this simple setting, it would be much easier to interpret the ¯ndings of
the simulation of the full model in section 4.2.
4.1.1 Retirement vs. Non participation at the age of 64
Consider ¯rst the options available to an unemployed worker of 64 years of age. Given our








immediate retirement or staying in the labor force for one more year without searching (ie, to
non-participate). The value of the latter option, is:
N64 = (b64 + l) + ¯64 A65 (B65 + l) = (bh ¼ + l) + ¯64 A65
µ
^ w +





with ¯64 standing for the one-period discount factor at age 64; b64 is the unemployment bene¯t
currently available to the individual, B65 is the pension available in one year time when retiring
at 65 (updated according to equation (2)); A65 is a short for AT
65 in section 3.2, ie the present
discounted value of one unit of income at every period after 65: A65 =
PT
i=65 ¯i¡65 S(ij65). In
case of immediate retirement, the value function takes the form:
R64 = (B64 + l) + ¯64 A65 (B64 + l) = (¹64 ^ w + l) + ¯64 A65 (¹64 ^ w + l) (11)
These two expressions make clear that the non-participation decision is based on purely ¯nancial
considerations (the value of leisure is similar in both pathways):




·h ¼ ¡ ^ w
D
¡ ¹64 ^ w
¶
> ¹64 ^ w ¡ bh¼ (12)
Expression (12) makes apparent the rationality of choosing to non-participate by a large
part of the Spanish unemployed of advanced age. In most common situations, current pension
payments would exceed the unemployment bene¯ts (the di®erence is the RHS of (12)) while the
opposite would be true of future pensions (the term in brackets in the LHS of (12)). This is
because the gain from lower early-retirement penalties is normally larger than the loss implied
by the dynamic updating inside ^ w. If that is the case, postponing retirement can lead to
signi¯cant utility gains, due to the fact that the pension increase is enjoyed during the whole
remaining lifespan of the individual (re°ected by the factor A64 in the LHS). Overall, equation
(12) formalizes that it is optimal to stay in the labor force without searching if the discounted
value of the future gains from a larger pension exceeds the associated losses in current income.13
With the current Unemployment Bene¯t rules, only the long-term unemployed (h ¸ 3) su®er
signi¯cant reductions in current income and future pension rights. Consequently, it seems clear
that (for moderate values of the discount factor), delaying retirement at 64 may be optimal for
a majority of the unemployed with a duration of less than two years.14
A second important insight from expression (12) is the essential role played by the pension
rules in fostering non-participation. In particular, delaying retirement is more favorable in utility
13With a non linear utility, elasticity/risk aversion considerations also have a role in the decision. Individuals
with higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution (or a smaller degree of relative risk aversion) would not mind
temporary drops in income in exchange for larger income gains in the future. Therefore, these workers would
tend to non-participate rather than to early retire. Minimum/maximum pensions will also have a clear (and well
known) impact, fostering earlier retirement. The absence of ¯ring cost, in contrast, is neutral in this case and has
a marginal impact in the cases analyzed below.
14Expression (12) can also be used to predict the di®erences in behavior with di®erent pension rights and
previous wages. For a ¯xed h, we should expect more non-participation among those with lower pension rights
and with higher previous wages, if the following parametric restrictions apply: ¯64 A65[1 ¡ ¹64 ¡ (1=D)] < ¹64








terms the smaller the value of ¹64, ie. the higher the early retirement penalty.15 Large early
retirement penalties make sense to stop the employees from leaving the labor force early. The
fact that they also push the unemployed into non-participation (by preventing their retirement)
is, most certainly, an important unintended consequence of the design of this policy.
4.1.2 The job-acceptance decision of unemployed workers at 64
Unemployment rules and, more interestingly, pension regulations are also crucial for the job-
acceptance decisions of the unemployed that try to return to employment. To illustrate this
point we explore the reservation wages of the unemployed in the simpli¯ed environment discussed
above. Firstly, it is clear that the value of accepting a wage w at the age of 64, W64, is simply:
W64 = w + ¯64 A65
µ
^ w +




The value of working at this age is linear in the wage and in the accrued pension rights. Di-
rect comparison with the value functions of non-participant (10) and retirees (11) lead to the
corresponding reservation wages (recall the de¯nition in equation (9)):
w64 =
[bh+¯64 A65 ·h=D]¼+l
1+¯64 A65=D if Non-Participation is optimal (13)
w64 = [ ¹64+¯64 A65(¹64¡(1¡ 1
D))] ^ w+l
1+¯64 A65=D if Retirement is optimal (14)
The impact of public regulations is clear. When the opportunity cost of accepting a job o®er
is given by the value of non-participation, the willingness to take o®ers clearly depends on the
generosity of Unemployment Bene¯ts. This generosity manifests in two forms; as current income
(controlled by ¹) or as di®ered income materialized in bigger future pensions (controlled by ·).
Higher ¹ or higher · will increase the LHS of (13), leading to larger reservation wages. When
the best alternative to re-employment is immediate retirement (as in equation (14)), pension
rules take over as the relevant public institutions. Again, more generous pensions will make
unemployed workers more selective when accepting re-employment o®ers.
So far we have abstracted from the role played by labor market conditions in the optimal
individual behavior. This can be changed just by iterating backwards one period to age 63, as
the full set of labor states are potentially valuable options for workers at that age. The next
sub-section deals with this more general case.
4.1.3 The role of labor market conditions in re-employment and retirement
At the age of 63, unemployed workers may search during one period to be entitled to the option
of receiving a job o®er in the next period. The value function in this case re°ects a trade-o®
between the present cost of searching and the value derived from the chances of getting a good
job o®er in the next period:








S63 = bh¼ ¡ c + ¯63
·






where h0 = h+1 and ^ w0 is updated as in equation (4). Note that this expression is a particular
case of the value of searching discussed in section 3.2.2. The alternatives to search are either
staying in the labor force without searching or outright retirement. We review them in turn,
starting with the former. The value of staying in the labor force without searching is:
N63 = (bh¼ + l) + ¯63 U64( ^ w0;h + 1)
With a little algebra, we can characterize the optimal searching behavior (vis a vis the
alternative of non participation) by the following condition:
S63 ¡ N63 > 0 , ¯63 ¸h0
·





(w ¡ w64)dFw > c + l (16)
In words, it is optimal to search when the expected bene¯ts (LHS) exceed the immediate costs
(RHS) which include a direct income loss, c, and the opportunity cost of forgone leisure, l. The
(potential) future bene¯ts of returning to work also include two aspects: an improvement in
immediate income at 64 and, through its e®ect on the pension rights, a boosts to future pension
income. These two e®ects can be easily identi¯ed in the two terms inside the brackets of the
expression in the left hand side of (16).
Condition (16) highlights the importance of labor market conditions on the self-selection
of the unemployed into nonparticipation: it is rational not to engage in a search process for
those unemployed workers with weak re-employment prospects (represented by the probability
of receiving an acceptable o®er). It also makes clear that the design of both the Unemployment
Bene¯ts and the Pension System can help to keep the unemployed away of the labor market,
through its impact on the value of search. Note that this value is decreasing in the future
reservation wage, whose value, in turn, is increasing in the generosity of the public institutions
(as documented in section 4.1.2 above).
It is possible that the alternative of outright retirement were more valuable than non-
participation. In this case, the trade-o® is roughly similar to that discussed in section 4.1.1:
a choice between the immediate income/leisure gains of retirement versus the prospect of bet-
ter future income of searching. Here the higher future income comes from two sources: from
the reduction in early retirement penalties and (in contrast with the situation at 64) from the
possibility of receiving a good job o®er, which would increase future labor income and pensions.
The current costs of staying active, however, are increased by the need of incurring the search
cost. The analytical expressions in this case become rather cumbersome, and had been con¯ned
to Appendix A. Overall, better market conditions would again make searching more attractive
and would foster later retirement.
To conclude the review of the impact of the labor market conditions on individual behavior








searching at the age of 63. Note that the more general environment faced at the age of 63
adds nothing of substance to the discussion of Non-Participation versus Retirement in section
4.1.1 and to the discussion of reservation wages against the alternatives of retirement or non-
participation in section 4.1.2. The value of reentering the labor force with wage w at 63 is:

















where we can appreciate the impact of the two extra working years (63 and 64) in the ¯nal value
of pension rights. It is easy to obtain an expression for the reservation wage when combined
with the value of S63 in expression (15):
w63 =
·

















As one may expect, good prospects of future job-o®ers (summarized in a high value of
searching S63) may lead workers to turn down a low wage o®er currently available. Of course,
the empirical importance of this possibility at such advanced ages seems rather small.
4.2 Simulation Experiments
The theoretical analysis in the previous sections leads to a number of valuable insights into the
basic trade-o®s controlling optimal individual behavior. In this section we go one step further by
exploring the basic predictions of the complete model (without any simpli¯cation) with the help
of illustrative examples. We proceed as follows. We ¯rst (section 4.3) introduce our baseline case
and discuss the implications of the di®erent values assigned to the parameters of the model. We
then, discuss the details of the optimal retirement and search behavior by individual state in our
baseline case (section 4.4.1). Next, section 4.4.2 is devoted to compare the aggregate predictions
of the model with the broad empirical trends discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2. Finally, in section
4.4.3 we undertake some extra aggregate simulations. On the one hand, we explore the relative
contribution of (perverse) institutional incentives vs. bad labor market conditions to the low
reemployment rates observed at advanced ages. On the other hand, we explore a couple of
institutional reforms aimed at facilitating the return into employment by reducing the incidence
of non-participation.
4.3 Calibration
As the complete model can not be solved analytically, the quantitative properties of the solutions
must be established via simulations. A brief description of the numerical solution method is
provided in Appendix B. In this section we discuss the calibration process. We proceed in two
steps: we choose a baseline economy by applying an informal calibration approach, and then
check the robustness of the ¯ndings to changes in the parameter values through a complete set
of sensitiviy simulations16.









The general idea of calibrating a model implies choosing properties of the data, ¯rst, and
then ¯nding the parameters of the model that best match the data in the chosen dimensions. To
implement it, however, we must distinguish the parameters with direct empirical counterparts
from those that lack direct observable references. The calibration process only really applies
to the latter. In our case, the institutional parameters and the mortality process belong to the
former group and so it is relatively easy to assign them concrete numerical values. Preference
parameters and the properties of the job o®ers are unobservable and should be dealt with in
a more indirect way. We discuss the functional forms and parameters values chosen in both
situations next.
² Institutions, Survival and dismissal rate
The parameters describing the pension and unemployment schemes are set to reproduce
their direct empirical counterparts as of 2002. Retirement pensions are, then, ¯rst available
at the age of 60, with an annual early-retirement penalty of 7.5% of the accrued pension
rights. ^ w is computed to approximate a moving average of the 15 years immediately
before retirement (according to equation (4)). The full pension is granted at the normal
retirement age of 65. The value of the minimum and maximum pensions are, respectively
5.7 and 23.8 (thousand of 2002 Euros, per annum).
Unemployed workers receive 65% of their previous wages as bene¯ts during the ¯rst year
out of work (and average of the 70% being provided in the ¯rst six months, and the 60%
provided thereafter, till a maximum of two years). This ¯gure is then reduced to 60%
in the second year and just 75% of the minimum contribution (6.2 thousand Euros) in
subsequent years. The general proportionality of bene¯ts and wages (for durations of less
than two years), then, is broken by the minimum subsidy and a ceiling of two times the
minimum contribution (12.4 thousand Euros)17.
Finally, we calibrate the dismissal rate (±) to 6.5%, the average annual value observed in
the entire MCVL sample for workers in the age range 50-65. This is coherent with our
treatment of transitions from employment into unemployment as an exogenous process.
² Preferences and Job-wage o®ers
Strictly speaking, all preference and labor market parameters impact (to some extend) the
retirement and reemployment decisions of the individuals and their associated accepted
wages. It is not possible, then, to (1) make a partition of the parameter space; (2) make a
partition of the space of empirical properties and (3) ¯nd a one-to-one relationship among
the resulting subgroups. A substantial degree of separability, however, is possible. This is
intensively exploited in our informal calibration process, as we describe next:
1. Reemployment behavior (ie, the reemployment hazards by age and duration) depends
on the willingness to search and to accept job o®ers after searching. They, in turn,
depend on the labor market conditions and on the cost of searching. It turns out the
17This value is a compromise between the ¯gure for those with more than two descendants (2.25 times the








job-acceptance decisions are essentially controlled by, ¯rst, the rate of arrival of job
o®ers (¸1) and, second, by the cost of searching and the relative value of leisure.18
We add a \histeresis" parameter that reduce the job o®er arrival rate depending on
the duration in unemployment Á. To quantitatively replicate the stylized facts S1 and
S2 as best as possible we set the constant annual arrival rate to 45%, the duration
dependence value to 60% (meaning that ¸2 = 0:6¸1 and ¸3 = 0:62 ¸1), the search
costs c to 5% and a leisure value l of 5%. The results are discussed in detail in section
4.4.2.
2. The wages accepted by workers that re-enter the labor market are most dependent
on the properties of the process generating the size of wage o®ers. As is standard
in the literature, we assume them to be lognormally distributed with annual mean ¹
and standard deviation ¾. To quantitatively approximate S4 we set ¹ to 8 thousand
euros per annum, with a pretty large standard deviation ¾ of 4.5 thousand euros per
annum.
3. We ¯nally target retirement behavior, paying special attention to the hazards by
age and by duration in unemployment. The discount factor ¯ and the relative risk
aversion ´ emerged as the crucial parameters controlling this dimension of behavior.
The values we select for the benchmark case are a 10% pure time discount and a
relative risk aversion value of 4. These values are within the ranges usually encounter
in the literature and permit a reasonable reproduction of the empirical regularities
(with the limitations discussed in section 4.4.2).
4.4 Simulation Findings
4.4.1 Optimal policy functions
In this section we summarize the basic properties of the optimal \policy functions" of the model,
ie. the optimal retirement, non-participation and job-acceptance rules of unemployed workers
conditional on their age, previous wage, pension rights and duration in unemployment.
Table 1 summarizes the optimal decisions of our baseline workers in some selected ages. Each
matrix is computed for one particular age (58, 62 and 64) and duration in unemployment (h=1
and h=3). The layout is similar for all of them: each shows whether it is optimal to search (value
1 in the table), to retire (zero) or to stay inactive (letter N) for some illustrative combinations
of previous wage ¼ -increasing by row- and pension rights ^ w -increasing by column-.
It is more illustrative to discuss the results starting by the intermediate matrix, corresponding
to age 62. For the unemployed with less than one year on the rolls (h=1) we see that retirement
tends to prevail in the top right corner of the matrix, ie. for workers with high pension rights
and low previous wages. This is not surprising: the value of the retirement option is larger the
higher the pension (which is proportional to ^ w), while higher ¼ leads to a larger value of all the
unemployment options (through both higher current and future income) and, consequently, to
18Note that, in all cases, the number of empirical moments that we try to replicate is much larger than the








AGE=58 H=1 AGE=58 H=3
¼n ^ w 5 8 10 13 16 19 ¼n ^ w 5 8 10 13 16 19
4. 1 1 1 1 N N 4. N N N N N N
7. 1 1 1 1 N N 7. N N N N N N
10. 1 1 1 1 N N 10. N N N N N N
14. 1 1 1 1 1 N 14. N N N N N N
18. 1 1 1 1 1 N 18. N N N N N N
22. 1 1 1 1 1 N 22. N N N N N N
26. 1 1 1 1 1 N 26. N N N N N N
29. 1 1 1 1 N N 29. N N N N N N
AGE=62 H=1 AGE=62 H=3
¼n ^ w 5 8 10 13 16 19 ¼n ^ w 5 8 10 13 16 19
4. 1 1 0 0 0 0 4. 0 0 0 0 0 0
7. 1 1 0 0 0 0 7. 0 0 0 0 0 0
10. 1 1 N 0 0 0 10. 0 0 0 0 0 0
14. 1 1 N N 0 0 14. 0 0 0 0 0 0
18. 1 1 N N N N 18. 0 0 0 0 0 0
22. 1 1 N N N N 22. 0 0 0 0 0 0
26. 1 1 N N N N 26. 0 0 0 0 0 0
29. 1 N N N N N 29. 0 0 0 0 0 0
AGE=64 H=1 AGE=64 H=3
¼n ^ w 5 8 10 13 16 19 ¼n ^ w 5 8 10 13 16 19
4. N 0 0 0 0 0 4. 0 0 0 0 0 0
7. N N 0 0 0 0 7. 0 0 0 0 0 0
10. N N 0 0 0 0 10. 0 0 0 0 0 0
14. N N N 0 0 0 14. 0 0 0 0 0 0
18. N N N N 0 0 18. 0 0 0 0 0 0
22. N N N N N 0 22. 0 0 0 0 0 0
26. N N N N N 0 26. 0 0 0 0 0 0
29. N N N N N 0 29. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Optimal individual decisions at selected ages in the benchmark simulation. Nota-








a lower incidence of retirement19. Non-participation, in turn, is common for the combination of
simultaneously high pension rights and previous wages. With homogeneous search cost and value
of leisure, the key element for the decision to stay inactive is the expected value of searching.
This is lower the higher the reservation wages, which, in turn, crucially depend on out-of-the-
job income. Therefore, w is higher the higher the pension income (ie. the higher ^ w) or the
higher the Unemployment Bene¯ts (ie. the higher ¼). This explains why searching is the ¯rst
best choice for only relatively poor unemployed (those with low previous wages and accumulated
pension rights). For the long-term unemployed (intermediate right matrix of Table 1) retirement
becomes the highest valued option. The reason lies in the drop in both current unemployment
income and future pension rights experienced by these workers. In our simulations, this drop is
strong enough to dominate the potential gains from reducing the early retirement penalties by
staying in the rolls for one additional period.
As we approach the normal retirement age (ie, as we move downwards in the table) the
previous ¯ndings are modi¯ed in two ways. First, the retirement option becomes more valuable,
as the early retirement penalties vanishes. This manifests in our simulations in two ways: by
increasing outright transitions into retirement, and by substantially increasing the reservation
wages of unemployed of shorter durations. This leads to the second clear pattern: active search
becomes much less relevant (it actually disappears with the parameter values in our benchmark
case). The drop in the relative value of searching induced by higher reservation wages can be
clearly appreciated in expression (16). In contrast, search is more valuable if we consider pre-
retirement ages (ie, before the age when pensions are ¯rst available). This can be appreciated
in the matrices on the top row of Table 1. Non-participation is still the predominant option
for most long-term unemployed, due to the rapid deterioration of the job arrival rate with the
duration of the unemployment spell. For the rest, it is mainly con¯ned with workers with very
high pension rights.
4.4.2 Aggregate predictions: Base case
The basic idea in this section is simple: we compute the labor transitions predicted by the model
in a population whose observable characteristics are distributed as in the Spanish economy in
1998/2004 (as re°ected by the MCVL05 sample). The model predictions are subsequently
compared with the empirical transitions recorded for that very same population (discussed in
section 2). A more detailed description of the design of the simulations is con¯ned to Appendix
B.1.
The basic aggregate predictions of our baseline model are shown, along with their empirical
counterparts, in Figure 6. It is apparent that the model does an acceptable job in reproducing
the broad empirical patterns of retirement, reemployment and accepted wages by age. Under
closer examination, however, some relevant discrepancies do appear. This is better appreciated
in Figures 7 and 8. Of course, this is not surprising, given the rather stylized character of the
implemented model.
19Note that while maximum unemployment bene¯ts pose a clear limit to the strict proportionality between ¼









































Non Participation %, by age
Figure 6: Theoretical predictions from the Baseline model (+, dashed line) vs empirical data
(-). Transition from Unemployment to Retirement and Employment by age (top row); annual
reemployment wage and incidence of Non-Participation by age (bottom row).
Consider ¯rst the predictions of the model regarding re-employment. The predicted
hazard by age is monotone decreasing (top-left panel of Figure 6) which conforms nicely with
stylized fact S1 in the pre-retirement ages. However, the model has di±culties in generating
enough reemployment after the ERA. Given the patterns of retirement at that age (discussed
below) this may be pointing to composition e®ects: if early retirement is higher for the group of
unemployed with weaker re-employment prospects, the unemployed remaining after 60 may have
better average re-employment hazards than those predicted by a model with a homogenous (in
terms of unobservable characteristics) population. Regarding duration (fact S2) we see (bottom
panels of Figure 7) that, again, the model performs well before the ERA and fall short after 60.
We learn that the main di±culties lie within the group of long-term unemployed: in the model,
the option of searching is dominated by the alternatives of retirement or non-participation,
while in the data there exists a signi¯cant incidence of re-employment. This hints at similar
composition e®ects to those mentioned above. The predicted behavior conditional on the size of























































Figure 7: Comparison of the data (-) and the theoretical predictions (- -): re-employment hazard
















































Figure 8: Comparison of the data (-) and the theoretical predictions (- -): re-employment hazard








agreement before 60, and di±culties after the ERA. The model reproduces the lower reentry
levels of the unemployed with higher pensions rights, but goes too far away in the process
(predicting no reentry at all for workers above the 2/3 percentage of the distribution by ^ w).
Finally, and back to Figure 6, we see that the model does a good job in reproducing the average
level of re-employment wages. The overall picture is that the empirical regularities seem to
¯t well with the economic incentives included in the model in the age range 55/60. After 60
the model has di±culties due to the low reentry rate of the long-term unemployed and of the
workers entitled with high pension rights. Extending the model to include some unobservable
heterogeneity (eg. in the labor market opportunities) will undoubtedly help to bridge the gap
between the model and the data after the early retirement age.
Predictions in terms of retirement seem to ¯t the data better that predictions about
reemployment. Again, there are di®erences when looking into the details, but the overall view
is very satisfactory: empirical behavior seems to be very responsive to the economic incentives
included in the model. First, the model generate clear spikes of retirement at the Normal and at
the Early retirement ages, in accordance with R1 (top right panel of Figure 6). The model does
not generate as much early retirement as in the data, both at the age of 60 and at the immediately
following ages. This may re°ect unobserved heterogeneity in the discount factor (interacting with
borrowing constraints) and/or the existence of health shocks. By conditioning on unemployment
duration (top row of Figure 7) we see that the mismatch tends to concentrate on unemployed
with less than 2 years of duration. But this discrepancy seems small in comparison with the
overall success of the model in this dimension. Both in the data and in the model, shifting
from the generous contributive unemployment bene¯t into the unemployment subsidy after two
years on the rolls goes hand in hand with a huge increase in retirement hazard (stylized fact R2).
Finally, the model also performs remarkably well in predicting retirement conditional on the level
of the pension rights (top row of Figure 8). As in the data (R3), the unemployed with lower
pension rights tend to leave in larger numbers at the ERA, while the hazard become monotone
increasing in ^ w after that age. For workers with high pension rights, however, the model seems
to overestimate the extend of non-participation, resulting in lower retirement hazards than in
the data.
4.4.3 Aggregate predictions: Experiments
The bottom-right panel of Figure 6 plots the proportion of the sample population (by age) for
whom staying in the labor force without searching is the optimal decision. The quantitative
importance of this behavior is quite astonishing. The average value in the age range 55/65
is 56.8% (¯rst row of Table 2), although the value undergoes signi¯cant changes by age: it
grows systematically till reaching a peak at a value close to 70% at the age of 58. After that
it remains pretty constant until approaching the Normal Retirement Age. The incidence also
changes with duration: before 60 it mainly a®ects the long-term unemployed, while after 60 it
is predominant among the unemployed with less than two years of duration. These numbers
suggest that the moral hazard problem associated with unemployment insurance is specially
acute at advanced ages. The reason, as discussed in detail in section 4.1.1, lies in the interaction








Experiment Simulation Average %
Non participation Re-employment Re-employment 60/65 Retirement 60/65
BASE 56.8 4.96 1.61 25.36
¸=90% 34.9 13.23 5.03 25.36
b rep 50% 53.8 4.68 1.17 38.43
Separate ¹ 27.8 7.10 5.09 53.61
Table 2: Simulation results: Incidence of Non-participation and average re-entry and retire-
ment hazards in the age range 55/65 (60/65 when stated) in 4 economic environments: Baseline
case (BASE); High o®er arrival rate (¸=80%); Low unemployment bene¯t (b rep 50%); Early re-
tirement penalties of the unemployed ¯xed at the age of departure from the labor force (Separate
¹).
retirement penalties embedded in the pension formula. With the present institutional design,
staying unemployed without searching is a relatively low-cost way of increasing the future pension
income for a majority of the unemployed (aged 58 or older). In the next two sections we explore
how this pattern change in alternative institutional and labor market scenarios.
The Impact of unfavorable labor market conditions
A popular explanation for the small number of transitions back into employment observed
among the Spanish unemployed of advanced age is the harsh labor market conditions faced by
this group. The idea is simply that in a labor market as rigid as that in Spain, the chances
of ¯nding an acceptable new job after an unemployment spell at those ages is very low. If
this is true, it probably implies that the e®ort of engaging in costly training to improve one's
re-employment chances is not worthwhile.
Our model gives us a chance to test how much of the high non-participation rates is due to
the poor labor market conditions and how much can be attributed to the incentives provided by
the institutional design. This can be done with a simple counterfactual experiment: compute
the optimal decisions of the unemployed in a world with the same institutional environment but
better labor market conditions. Figure 9 and the second row of Table 2 reports the results of
such an experiment. We double the rate of arrival of job o®ers, ¸, independently of the duration
in unemployment and keeping all other parameters as in the benchmark case. We ¯nd that the
reentry hazard rate more than doubles, reaching an average value of 13.2%. Most of the gain
is achieved among workers of less than 60 years, specially long term unemployed (which ¯nd
searching more advantageous under the new conditions); in the age range 60/65 the re-entry
hazard is a still very modest 5%. The incidence of retirement is hardly changed and, more
importantly, non-participation is still very important, with an average value of 34.9% and peaks
close to 60% when approaching the Normal Retirement Age.
Our conclusion from these numbers is that institutional incentives matter a great deal,
without denying the crucial role played by the labor market conditions. We conjecture that,
even with the harsh re-employment chances in our baseline scenario, alternative institutional










































Figure 9: Theoretical prediction in the benchmark case (-), ie with ¸=40% and under more
favorable labor market conditions, ie. with ¸=80% (- -)
Institutional Reforms
The underlying problem in this section is similar to that addressed by the optimal unemployment
literature with imperfect information, ie. to try to avoid the abuse of the insurance system by
limiting the protection provided (to the point that claiming the bene¯t is only pro¯table for
those really su®ering the insured condition). The simplest possible way of achieving this is
by reducing the size of the unemployment bene¯t. This should make the option of staying
unemployed without searching less attractive. For \good risks", ie. workers with good chances
of re-employment, this institutional change should push them back to active work. For \bad
risks" ie. workers whose skills are in low demand, making them very hard to re-employ, this
should push them into early retirement (paying the price of a heavily penalized pension).
Unemployment bene¯t reform
Figure 10 and the third row of Table 2 reports the results of reducing the replacement rate of
Unemployment Bene¯ts from 65% of the previous wage (60 % for h=2) to 50%. We ¯nd pretty
unsuccessful results. Non-participation does go down (from 56.8 to 53.8), but this happens
largely from the self-selection of the \bad risks" into retirement rather than from an increase
in the re-entry hazard (which hardly change, despite a pretty substantial drop in accepted
wages). Essentially, all behavioral changes limit to some extra retirement after 60 among the
unemployed with less than 2 years of duration. In a few cases, this change actually reduces
the search e®ort, due to the higher relative value of retiring. In summary, this policy change
achieves very little in terms of extra labor supply for the costs it imposes in the welfare of the








Figure 10: Unemployment bene¯t reform: Theoretical prediction in the benchmark case (-)





































































Figure 11: Pension bene¯t reform: Theoretical prediction in the benchmark case (-), and








Reform of the early retirement penalties
In section 4.1.1 we showed that early retirement penalties favor non-participation by making
it possible to obtain larger future pension income without searching. Obviously, preventing
the early retirement of employees makes perfect sense; That the early retirement penalties
will also retain the unemployed in the labor force (largely without searching) is an unintended
consequence. This points to the convenience of designing separate pension formulae for the
employees and the unemployed.
Although di®erent alternative schemes can be ¯gured out, the most straightforward idea is
simply to stop the automatic increase of the pension while the unemployed stay out of job. A
simple way of achieving this is by making the early retirement penalty depend on the age of exit
form employment, rather than the age when the individual claim the pension bene¯t. It would
amount to changing the replacement rate ¹(a) in equation (3) to ¹(a ¡ h). So if somebody
is made redundant at the end of the year when he/she is 59, his/her \Base reguladora", ^ w;
will be equally punished if he retires immediately (a=60, h=0) or if he/she waits for one year
(a=61, h=1) or longer. This (rather ruthless) reform eliminate the incentives to stay idle while
enjoying the unemployment bene¯t20. Figure 11 and the bottom row of Table 2 reports the
results of this reform. It is very successful in fostering re-employment after 60: the hazard
in that range of ages is almost four times larger than in the base simulation (although this
is partly achieved via reductions in the accepted re-entry wages). It also pushes some of the
non-participant unemployed of more than 60 years of age into retirement. All these changes are
essentially concentrated among the unemployed with shorter durations and average or above-
average previous wages. At 60 it a®ects mostly unemployed with high pension rights, but this
changes as we approach the Normal Retirement age. All in all, non participation after 60 is very
substantially reduced by the reform.
5 Conclusions
The most basic conclusion we can draw from our analysis so far is that the empirical labor
behavior at advanced ages can be rationalized as the response of rational individuals to both
the labor market conditions and the institutional incentives. We have shown that a model that
combines those two elements goes a long way in reproducing the re-employment and retirement
patterns observed in the Spanish data. One important contribution of this paper relates to the
role of the institucional incentives: we show via simulation that even in presence of a much
larger arrival rate of job o®ers, the predicted re-employment rate in the current institutional
setting would not improve a great deal. The combination of generous Unemployment Bene¯ts
(for durations of up to two years), and substantial penalties for early retirement are to be blamed
for this. Together, they make staying unemployed without searching an optimal strategy for a
very large part (around 50%) of the unemployed in the age range 55/65. Although the Spanish
authorities have largely turned a blind eye on this \alternative" exit route into retirement, it
20The proposed reform treats the unemployed in a harsh way and would undoubtedly generate strong political
resistance. We have analyzed some \intermediate" reforms like increasing the pension rights of the unemployed
only after a successful return to the labor force. The proposed reforme is, nonetheless, specially interesting as an








seems a clear abuse of the original mandate of the unemployment insurance scheme (namely,
support workers in their search process).
Our simulations shows that changing this state of a®airs would demand substantial reforms of
the present institutions. We ¯nd that reducing the generosity of Unemployment Bene¯ts would
not be particularly successful, as it pushes workers mainly into retirement. A more promising
(although rather ruthless) avenue focuses on redesigning the early retirement penalties of the
unemployed. If the penalty were ¯xed according to the age when the individual e®ectively
withdraws from the labor force (rather than when he/she claims the pension for the ¯rst time),
the incentives to stay idle would be much smaller. Our simulation indicate that such a measure
would be very e®ective in reducing non-participation and increasing labor supply, specially after
the early retirement age.
There are some possible extensions of the current work that may improve the quality of our
¯ndings. We are specially interested in analyzing the impact of including several dimensions
of unobserved heterogeneity. We plan to consider in our future research explicit population
distributions for the discount factor and the arrival rate of job o®ers. This seems to be a
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A The role of labor market conditions in re-employment and
retirement
The di®erence in value between retiring and searching at the age of 63 are:
R63¡S63 > 0 , ¹63 ^ w+l¡bh ¼+C+¯[¹63 ^ w+l¡E(I64)¡E(l64)]+¯2 A65 [B63¡E (B65( ^ w65))] > 0
with expected future income, leisure and pensions:
E(I64) = (1 ¡ ¸h+1 Fw4)(bh+1 ¼) + ¸h+1
R M
w64 wdFw
E(l44) = (1 ¡ ¸h+1 Fw4)l
E(B65( ^ w65)) = ^ w +
·h ¼¡ ^ w
D (1 ¡ 1
D)+
(1 ¡ ¸h+1 Fw4)






The current utility cost of staying in the labor force includes lower income, search cost
and foregone leisure. In exchange, waiting not only (typically) increases the future pension by
reducing early retirement penalties, but also gives the individual a chance of receiving a good
job o®er, which would increase future labor income and pensions.
B Numerical solution method
There are no analytical solutions to the functional equations de¯ning the value functions de-
scribed in the previous sections. Consequently, we employ numerical methods to compute the
optimal retirement and search decisions, calculate the value functions and explore the basic
properties of the solutions.
Including two continuous states, the value functions are in¯nite dimensional objects and can
only be reproduced in the computer approximately. The use of some numerical approximation
method is, then, unavoidable. In particular, we:
² Discretize the continuos state variables when computing the value functions.
Thus, we build an uniform grid in the State Space XN = [¼m;¼M] £ [ ^ wm; ^ wM], with m
and M denoting, respectively, the inferior and superior bounds. N is the number of nodes
in the grid. In each iteration a = f55;:::;65g we compute:
Ua(xj;h) j = f1;:::;Ng h = f1;2;3g
² We use linear interpolation whenever a value function is evaluated outside the grid. For
example, to compute the reservation wage of an unemployed worker in state (¼; ^ w;h;a) we
have to evaluate Wa(w; ^ w) for any value of w (and not just w 2 f¼m;:::;¼Mg). We also
have to repeatedly evaluate the future value of staying unemployed with pension rights
that do not exactly match the values in the grid.
We use linear interpolation because, although is more time consuming than other higher









B.1 Design of the aggregate simulations
The basic idea is simply to compare the model predictions in term of transition °ows with
their empirical counterparts, taking the stocks as given.21 To implement this simple concept we
undertake a sort of Monte-Carlo experiment involving the following steps:
1. Create a large sample of individuals reproducing the empirical distribution of labor states
by fa;¼; ^ w;hg:
¹(¼; ^ w;a;h) a 2 f50;:::;65g h 2 f1;:::;3g ¼ 2 [¼m;¼M] ^ w 2 [ ^ wm; ^ wM]
2. Simulate the arrival of job o®ers and the size of the wage proposed, according with the
parametric functions included in our model.
3. Let the individual in the simulated sample react to the job o®ers (and to the alternative of
retiring from the labor force) in accordance with the model policy functions. Keep records
of the job acceptances and retirement decisions.
4. Aggregate the decisions, compute the implicit re-employment and retirement hazards and
compare with empirical counterparts.
21Note that the model also generates predictions in terms of stocks, but we abstract from them at this stage.
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